Jacek Gancarson
Światowy Kongres Polaków
swiatowykongrespolakow.pl Warsaw, updated 1.06.2026
This project proposes a systematic research assessment of whether a regulated, multilateral leasing mechanism for selected categories of military equipment could contribute to conflict prevention, regional stabilization, and more responsible arms-transfer governance.
The starting point of the project is a paradox in contemporary security policy. States facing acute external threats often need rapid access to defensive capabilities. However, large-scale conventional arms procurement can create long-term financial burdens, technological lock-in, regional arms-race dynamics, and incentives for destabilizing behaviour. Traditional arms sales are usually designed as permanent transfers of ownership. Once completed, they may contribute either to deterrence or to escalation, depending on the political context, command structures, end-use controls, and regional perceptions.
This project asks whether an alternative model — a carefully regulated system of temporary leasing of defensive military equipment — could offer a more flexible, transparent, and reversible instrument for crisis management. Such a mechanism would not replace existing arms-control regimes, export-control systems, or collective-security arrangements. Rather, it would be examined as a possible complementary tool for situations in which temporary defensive reinforcement could deter aggression, reduce incentives for preventive war, and create time for diplomatic settlement.
The project would be highly relevant to SIPRI’s research agenda on international arms transfers, military expenditure, transparency, arms-trade controls, and conflict prevention. SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database tracks international transfers of major conventional weapons from 1950 to 2025 and is designed to help researchers and policymakers identify suppliers, recipients, conflict-related arms flows, and potentially destabilizing accumulations of weapons. A research project on defence equipment leasing could build on this analytical tradition while opening a new field of inquiry: the relationship between ownership models, temporary capability transfers, deterrence, and escalation risks.
2. Background and Rationale
Military build-ups have historically imposed major economic and political costs on societies. They are often justified as collective investments in national security. Yet rapid accumulation of military superiority can also create dangerous political incentives. A state that achieves a temporary advantage may be tempted to use it before rivals adapt, rearm, or form counter-coalitions.
The problem is not limited to great-power rivalry. In a multipolar world, local and regional conflicts may be intensified by unequal access to industrial capacity, external suppliers, and financial resources. States with strong defence industries or deep capital reserves can acquire military advantages more quickly than weaker neighbours. This asymmetry may encourage coercive diplomacy, territorial pressure, political blackmail, or direct military action.
At the same time, threatened states often face a different dilemma. If they purchase large quantities of military equipment outright, they may incur long-term debt, become dependent on foreign suppliers, and risk acquiring systems that become obsolete or strategically irrelevant as the threat environment changes. Conventional procurement therefore creates a dual risk: insufficient defensive capacity in the short term, and inefficient or destabilizing accumulation in the long term.
A regulated leasing mechanism could theoretically address part of this dilemma. Instead of permanent ownership, selected defensive systems could be made available for a defined period, under strict political, legal, financial, and end-use conditions. If the threat diminishes, the equipment could be returned, upgraded, reassigned, or decommissioned. If the threat persists, leasing could be extended under renewed assessment.
This model requires careful research. It could reduce some risks associated with permanent arms accumulation, but it could also create new problems: escalation, supplier leverage, unclear responsibility for misuse, accountability gaps, and possible circumvention of arms-control norms. For this reason, the project should not begin with an assumption that leasing is necessarily stabilizing. It should instead evaluate under what conditions, if any, such a mechanism could contribute to security and conflict prevention.
Previus version:
State of Art
A build-up of states military resources has been always connected with an economic burden. The society generally has realized that the load is a kind of joint investment which ensures improvement of the society position in relation to other societies considered aggressive. In particular it could mean the availability of the option of preventive or restitution war. An intense and dynamic arming always creates a temptation of consumption of this arm investment by launching an armed conflict (Blixtkrig). E.g. in the 30’s of the last century a quick gain of large military superiority in Europe and Far East fueled aggression planning. So runs the subconscious of all communities: Fast reach of an uncontrolled military superiority automatically increases the tendency to extend the space of the hegemony either through political blackmails, or by direct military campaign for example in order to take control of resources of the opponent. It forms and then easily promotes the belief that military superiority must be used quickly before the opponents manage to rearm themselves. Such thinking was typical at the beginning of the Cold War in the 40’s and 50’s. First in late 70’s it was realized the futility of incurring huge expenditures in relatively fast aging (due to the mutual intensive rivalry) equipment and military systems.
Since the 80s of last century the situation has changed significantly: A bipolar world dominated by competition between two camps of countries with competing political systems has now become a multi-polar world. It was concluded by the leaders of the former bipolar world – the United States and Russia (who however still own over 90% of the global potential of nuclear weapons). Multi-polar world generally means an increase of the importance of local international relations and, in their absence, an increase of risk for local conflicts. A reduced dependence of countries from one of the two world leaders or from one of the new leaders (mainly China) awakens rising ambitions and activity of local rulers and makes local conflicts of interest coming to the surface. However, temptation to take benefits of a fast build of military superiority remains valid even locally.
The global defense industry does not encounter nowadays equally strict market division as during the cold war but it applies own and country ethical codes. On the other hand a natural interests of defence industry is to obtain favorable arms contracts, which mean sales for huge sums of money. However, again – there may be a negative effect of such direct sales “for cash”. The physical realization of the purchase brings an additional motivation for the purchasing state to consume achieved military superiority, especially if the equipment is purchased abroad, usually without sufficient manufacturer support. On the other hand, if the threat of foreign aggression passes away or (even worse) if the threats pattern changes and the purchased weapons are no longer relevant, then the buyer state has limited possibility to rearm because of former investment in already obsolete equipment. (It is known that necessary financial resources may be allocated unevenly). Current practice of high volume, long term purchases by the states is characterized by high costs, technological aging, unpredictable future needs and then security devaluation.
The Solution
As seeing it from the perspective of objectives of sustainable development, the EU and the United Nations in consultation with the World Bank and other global financial organizations should develop and promote large-scale mechanism of leasing of military equipment for rapid regional balancing of armaments in the situation where one party has a large industrial or financial potential, and the other side is deprived of them. Fast physical availability of acquisition of defensive military equipment for countries that want to suppress / cool down growing aggression or aggressive plans of its neighbors is invaluable: military capability of a threatened state is dramatically increased, preventing an immediate armed conflict and giving time for political solutions with the help of global organizations. The need for involvement of forces and military means from leading militarily countries and organizations (e.g. NATO) to resolve the conflict, decreases. Concentration of weapons in the area of potential conflict is a temporary by definition and limited to winning time for the resolution of conflict by domestic and international think-tanks in order to mange the situation by intellectual potential rather than by a “darwinistic” fight. After-war restoration costs are eliminated. A important advantage of such leasing mechanism is limitation of undue concentration of armaments as costs become the running costs and not capital costs. In this way the states become more interested in settlement of the conflict and the establishment of stable, granting the a contracted security rather than “consumption” of massive investment by an unilateral military aggression. Unused or hardly used weapons can be returned back to the seller and than can be leased again to other threatened countries.
It is important to stress that proposal concerns operational capability. Such weapon leasing mechanism must be carefully tuned and agreed on global level in order to strictly meet the objective of balancing tool for prevention of uncontrolled military conflicts.
The proposal will also activate financial markets. An EU-wide acceptance and attitude shift toward more flexibility, accuracy, subsidiarity and financial development for military response will bring more hope on global level.
The proposal was submitted to the Conference on the Future of Europe 2021:
https://futureu.europa.eu/en/processes/OtherIdeas/f/8/proposals/4006?locale=en
